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NOTES
A Partnership with the Government?

HOW THE INCLUSION OF ATTORNEY
CONTINGENCY FEES IN A PLAINTIFF'S GROSS
INCOME NEGATIVELY IMPACTS QUI TAM
LITIGATION*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, the federal circuit courts are split as to
whether the portion of a plaintiffs damages award paid as
attorney contingency fees can be excluded from the plaintiffs
gross income.! This restriction on the exclusion of attorney
contingency fees is of particular importance because while
attorney contingency fees are technically tax deductible as
"miscellaneous itemized deductions,"' in practice, plaintiffs
rarely can deduct them.' Thus, in circuits where contingency

© 2004 Edward T. Ackerman. All Rights Reserved.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that attorney
contingentcy fees do not constitute gross income, while the Second, Fourth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits have held that they do. See Raymond v. United States, 355
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v.
Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000); Coady v.
Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Barlow-Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th
Cir. 2000); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Cotnam v. Comm'r,
263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
2 26 U.S.C. § 67(b) (2000).
3 Since attorney's fees will generally constitute a sizable portion of a
plaintiffs income, their deduction will trigger the alternative minimum tax (AMT),
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fees are included in a successful plaintiffs gross income, the
plaintiff will have to pay tax on both the portion of the damages
he keeps and the portion paid to his attorney as fees. This
results in the "double taxation" of attorney's fees: the monies
are taxed once as income to the plaintiff, and then again as
income to the attorney.
While this inclusion of contingency fees in the
calculation of gross income and the resultant double taxation
undoubtedly results in an irritated plaintiff, it also has much
farther reaching implications. In the context of qui tam4 actions
brought under the Civil False Claims Act (CFCA),5 this
interpretation of the tax law has the effect of reducing the
statutorily prescribed incentives for the prosecution of
fraudulent acts perpetrated against the Government. This
reduction in incentives results because the plaintiff, or
"relator," as he is termed in the CFCA qui tam context, has to
pay income tax on both his recovery and any additional
attorney's fees that are awarded against the defendant, and
then has to pay a non-deductible contingency fee to his
attorney. 6 Ultimately, the relator only gets to keep
approximately four to seven percent of the Government's
judgment, despite being awarded upwards of twenty percent.7
As qui tam actions are greatly beneficial to both the
Government and the public, yet pose considerable professional
and personal risks to the relator,' this reduced award seems
patently unfair and contrary to Congress's stated intent.

which in turn will prohibit the deduction of "miscellaneous itemized deductions." 26
U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (2000).
' The term "qui tam" derives from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "Who as well for the king as
for himself sues in this matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (7th ed. 1999). A qui
tam action allows a private citizen to sue on behalf of the Government for damages
incurred by the Government. See William E. Kovacic, Pyrrhic Victories? Reexamining
the Effectiveness of Antitrust Remedies in Restoring Competition and Deterring
Misconduct: Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants to
Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766 (2001).
5 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). The CFCA imposes
liability on any person who knowingly presents or causes to be presented a false or
fraudulent claim to the United States Government. Since its amendment in 1986, the
CFCA has become a potentially powerful tool in combating frauds perpetrated against
the Government. See Kovacic, supra note 4, at 766.
' All or part of this fee may come from a court's award of attorney's fees
against the defendant under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d), depending on the terms of the
contingency fee agreement.
See infra Part II.B. for tax analysis of a qui tam judgment.
8 See United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1084, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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This Note argues that the current trend in the federal
circuit courts to include attorney contingency fees in a
successful plaintiffs gross income limits the full potential of
the CFCA's qui tam provisions by substantially reducing the
statutorily prescribed incentives for initiating these actions.
Part II of this Note provides the background on this issue,
including an analysis of how high damage awards will trigger
the AMT and a discussion of the circuit split. Part III presents
an overview of the CFCA and its qui tam provisions, including
the reasons for their enactment. Part IV then examines how
the inclusion of attorney's fees in the calculation of gross
income reduces a relator's incentive to initiate qui tam actions.
Finally, Part V considers possible solutions to this dilemma
and suggests that a focused amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), similar to the proposed Civil Rights Tax
Relief Act,9 is the best solution to this problem.

II.

BACKGROUND: THE INTERNAL
COMMON LAW TAX PRINCIPLES

A.

The Calculationof Taxable Income

REVENUE

CODE

AND

The calculation of a person's taxable income can be
distilled down to the basic equation of gross income minus
deductions.'0 Section 61 of the Code defines "gross income" as
"all income from whatever source derived."" The Supreme
Court has read the "sweeping terms" of section 61 to mean that
the statute "should be broadly construed in accordance with an
obvious purpose to tax income comprehensively." 2 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress intended that
all income be taxed except gains that are specifically
exempted.' 3 As non-compensatory damages constitute income to
a successful plaintiff within the meaning of the Code,' attorney
contingency fees must either be deducted or excluded from
gross income in order for them not to be taxed.

Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003, S. 557, 108th Cong. (2003).
, 26 U.S.C. § 63(a) (2000).
26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2000).
Comm'r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (citing Jacobson,
336 U.S. at 49; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87-91 (1934)).
" See id. at 431 (holding that litigants must include the punitive damages
portion of their awards in calculating their taxable income).
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Deductions are calculated based on whether they are
"above the line" deductions or "below the line" deductions. 5
Above the line deductions, such as trade and business
expenses, are one hundred percent tax deductible. 6 This means
that these expenses are subtracted dollar-for-dollar from a
person's gross income to determine their adjusted gross
income. 17 Below the line deductions, including "miscellaneous
itemized deductions," are not one hundred percent deductible;
only a portion of below the line deductions may be used to
offset one's taxable income. 8 Allowable below the line
deductions, once calculated, are then deducted from adjusted
gross income. 19
Miscellaneous itemized deductions are allowed "only to
the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2
percent of adjusted gross income."" Therefore, if a taxpayer
had $100,000 of adjusted gross income, and $5,000 of
miscellaneous itemized deductions, only $3,000 could be
deducted from a taxpayer's adjusted gross income as allowable
miscellaneous itemized deductions.2 ' However, if the adjusted
gross income exceeds $142,700 (the statutory "applicable
amount), the amount of allowable itemized deductions is
reduced by the lesser of "3 percent of the excess of adjusted
gross income over the applicable amount,

. .

. or 80 percent of

the amount of the itemized deductions otherwise allowable for
such taxable year."22 So, if a taxpayer had an adjusted gross
income of $200,000, and $15,000 of miscellaneous itemized
deductions, the deductions would be reduced by $1,719, leaving
$9,281 in allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions.23

" DANIEL Q. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 284 (1983).
IId.

19

See 26 U.S.C. § 62 (2000).
See 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (2000).
See id.

21

26 U.S.C. § 67(a).
This is calculated by taking 2% of $100,000 ($2,000), and subtracting it

'
18

from $5,000.
26 U.S.C. § 68 (2004).
This is calculated by subtracting $142,700 (the statutory applicable
amount) from $200,000 (the adjusted gross income), leaving $57,300 in excess of the
statutory applicable amount. Three percent of $57,300 ($1,719) is then subtracted from
$11,000 (allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions), leaving $9,281. Because 80% of
the miscellaneous itemized deductions ($8,800) exceeds $1,719, it is not taken into
consideration in this example. See 26 U.S.C. § 68 (2004).
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Limitations on the Deduction of Attorney Contingency
Fees: The Alternative Minimum Tax

As attorney contingency fees are not considered to be
trade or business expenses, they are included in the catchall
category of miscellaneous itemized deductions and are
theoretically deductible as such.24 However, when plaintiffs win
large awards that are dramatically higher than their normal
yearly income, the deduction of a sizable attorney's fee will
trigger the AMT and render the fees non-deductible. 25 The AMT
is statutorily defined as "the tentative minimum tax for the
taxable year, over the regular tax for the taxable year."2 6 In
substance, this formula means that a taxpayer must either pay
the regular tax or the tentative minimum tax, whichever is
27
greater.
The effect of the AMT is best illustrated by example.
Suppose Mister Tax Payer wins a $1 million award in a lawsuit
and has no other income for the year. For purposes of this
example, assume that this award consists wholly of punitive
damages, as awards for compensatory damages can be excluded
from gross income.28 Payer's attorneys are then paid $500,000
from the award for their contingency fee, leaving Payer with
$500,000. Suppose further that Payer also had no above the
line expenses, making his adjusted gross income for the year $1
million. If Payer were to deduct the $500,000 in fees as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction, his total taxable income
would be $545,719.29 According to the current rates, the total
regular tax liability on this amount would be $192,633.24.3o
Thus, after his attorney's fees and his taxes have been paid,
Payer would be left with $307,366.76 of his $1 million award.

"
2

26
27

26 U.S.C. § 67(b) (2000). See Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000). See Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946.
26 U.S.C.A. § 55(a) (2004).
See J. MARIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION 670 (2001).
' 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000).
2' This is calculated by subtracting $142,700 (the statutory "applicable
amount) from $1,000,000 (the adjusted gross income), leaving $857,300 in excess of the
statutory applicable amount. Three percent of $857,300 ($25,719) is then subtracted
from $480,000 (allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions), leaving $454,281 in total
allowable deductions. See 26 U.S.C. § 68.
"0The tax on $545,719 is calculated as follows: $75,528.50 + 39.6% of
adjusted gross income in excess of $250,000 (($545,719 - $250,000) x .396 = $117,104.72
+ $75,528.50 = $192,633.24). See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004).
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However, because the attorney's fees are extremely high
in comparison to Payer's adjusted gross income, resulting in
miscellaneous itemized deductions that would amount to
nearly one-half of the adjusted gross income, the AMT would be
of the Code,
triggered. Under section 56(b)(1)(A)(i)
miscellaneous itemized deductions are excluded from the
31
calculation of alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI);
thus, the entire $1 million would be included as Payer's taxable
income if the AMT is triggered. As Payer's tentative minimum
tax liability on this amount would be $276,500,31 $83,866.76
more than his calculated regular tax, he would have to pay the
alternative minimum tax amount.3 After subtracting taxes and
his attorney's fees, he would only be left with $223,500, less
than one fourth of his $1 million award.'
At this point, it is apparent that including attorney
contingency fees in the gross income of a successful plaintiff
will almost necessarily result in the plaintiff having to pay a
substantial tax on them. Consequently, the only way to avoid
this harsh result would be for the plaintiff to exclude the
contingency fees from his gross income.35
C.

Circuit Split: To Include or Not to Include?

The federal circuit courts are presently split on the issue
of whether attorney contingency fees can be excluded from a
plaintiffs gross income. The majority of circuits, reasoning that
attorney contingency fees constitute income to a successful
plaintiff, hold that such fees must be included in a plaintiffs
gross income.38 On the other hand, a minority of circuits hold
that the portion of a plaintiffs award paid to the attorney is not
income realized by the plaintiff and, therefore, need not be
The AMTI is a taxpayer's taxable income if the AMT is triggered.
32

The tentative minimum tax on $1,000,000 is calculated as follows: 26% of

$175,000 = $45,500. $45,000 + (28% of $825,000) = $276,500. See 26 U.S.C.A. §
55(b)(1)(A)(i) (2004).
26 U.S.C.A. § 55(a) (2004).
As the share of the award allotted for attorney's fees increases, these
results become even more dramatic. In cases where attorneys take a very high
percentage of the award for their contingency fees, such as 60% or 70%, it may in fact
be that the plaintiff is left in the red, owing the government more than he retained
from the recovery. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 425-26 (2000) (Beghe, J.,
dissenting).
See Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 946 (1st Cir. 1995).
See Greg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent
Attorney's Fee Arrangements,37 GA. L. REV. 57, 59 (2002).
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describe the approaches
analyzing this issue.

that both sides have taken in

1. The Minority Approach: The "Exclusion" Circuits
In 1959, the Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court to
pass on the inclusion/exclusion issue." In the watershed case of
Cotnam v. Commissioner," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the portion of a judgment paid to an attorney
pursuant to a contingency fee agreement was not income to the
plaintiff.4 ° The court reasoned that because Alabama attorney
lien law gave the attorney vested property rights in the
contingency fee portion of the judgment, a plaintiff could never
have received and retained that portion of the judgment and,
therefore, the plaintiff did not realize it as income."
Judges Rives and Brown, in an addition to the majority
opinion, dismissed the notion that the anticipatory assignment
of income doctrine was at odds with the court's holding.4 2 The
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, as set forth in
Lucas v. Earl,4 3 states that one cannot assign a right to future
income to avoid taxation." In other words, a person is taxable
on all income earned regardless of who actually receives that
income. Judges Rives and Brown wrote that at the time of
executing the contingency fee agreement, the value of
plaintiff's claim was "doubtful and uncertain," and that the
only way the plaintiff could derive economic benefit from the
claim was to use part of it as a means of collecting the
remainder.45 Based on this assumption, Judges Rives and
Brown concluded that the plaintiff assigned forty percent of her
cause of action to her attorney, not forty percent of future
income derived from the claim.46 Because the court determined
that the agreement amounted to an assignment of the cause of
s See id.
3' 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
Plaintiff, Ethel Cotnam, recieved
Cotnam's attorney's fees amounted
court held that the entire $120,000
40

Id.

41

Id. at 125.

1959). The relevant facts of Cotnam are as follows:
a judgment of $120,000 on a contract debt. Ms.
to $50,365.83, leaving her with $69,634.17. The tax
was taxable income to her. Id. at 120-21.

42 Id.

281 U.S. 111 (1930).

Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion Over
the Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 623,
628(1993).
45 Id.

4Id.
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action, it found that the anticipatory assignment of income
doctrine did not operate as a bar to this arrangement.4 7
Since the landmark Cotnam ruling, both the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have followed suit and allowed the exclusion
of attorney contingency fees from a plaintiffs gross income.4 8
The Eleventh Circuit ruled with the Fifth Circuit solely
because it found Cotnam to be on point and controlling,4 9 and
did not do any further analysis of the issue. ° The Sixth Circuit,
on the other hand, expanded on the Cotnam analysis, further
distinguishing the contingency fee agreement from the
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine."' First, the court
noted that unlike the anticipatory assignment of income cases,
where the assignment was between family members for a right
to income already earned, contingency fee arrangements were
arms-length transactions entered into when no right to
payment had yet been earned.5 2 It then concluded that
contingency fee arrangements operated "more like a division of
property than an assignment of income."" Accordingly, the
court held that the portion of the judgment that was paid
directly to the plaintiffs attorneys under the contingency fee
arrangement was not income to the plaintiff.
2. The Majority Approach: The "Inclusion" Circuits
Beginning in 1995, some circuit courts began to rule
that attorney contingency fees could not be excluded from a
plaintiffs gross income. 5 The prevailing analysis that runs
through these opinions focuses on the anticipatory assignment
of income doctrine and concerns regarding the assignment of
Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125 (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)).
See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 2000);
Barlow-Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000).
" "In Bonner v. City of Prichard,661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), this Court [the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals] adopted as binding precedent
all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of
business on September 30, 1981." Barlow-Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347 n.2.
See id. at 1347 n. 4.
See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 851-57.
52 Id. at 553. The court also noted that unlike in the anticipatory assignment
of income cases, where only the assignor was to be taxed, in the contingency fee
context, the attorney would also pay income tax on the fees. Id.
Id. at 857-58.
Id. at 858.
See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v. Comm'r,
240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000);
Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
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future income.56 However, unlike the Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
the majority of circuits hold that the anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine is applicable to the contingent fee
arrangement, and therefore bars the exclusion of attorney
contingency fees."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was the first circuit court to reject Cotnam's holding,58
and ushered in a new line of reasoning that the other
"inclusion" circuits would soon follow.59 In Baylin v. United
States,6" the court flatly rejected the plaintiffs argument that
because the value of a claim had not been established when the
contingency agreement was executed, there was no earned
income to assign. 61 The court reasoned that the contingency
arrangement was simply a mechanism by which the attorney
set the value of the attorney's services by tying the fees to the
award and then having the fee obligation discharged directly
by the defendant." The court further noted that this
arrangement was simply a "skillfully devised" fee arrangement
created to allow the plaintiff to escape paying tax on a portion
of its income," and was therefore, in substance, exactly what
the Supreme Court was trying to eliminate by announcing the
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine.'
To date, the most articulate argument against excluding
attorney's fees comes from Judge Posner's majority decision in
Kenseth v. Commissioner.65 Like the court in Baylin, the
Kenseth court mainly relied on the anticipatory assignment of
See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884; Young, 240 F.3d at 376; Coady, 213 F.3d at
1191; Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454.
" See Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2004); Kenseth,
259 F.3d at 884; Young, 240 F.3d at 377; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191; Baylin, 43 F.3d at
1455.
, Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455. While the Federal Circuit came to the opposite
conclusion as the Fifth Circuit, the Baylin decision never acknowledged the Fifth
Circuit's differing opinion on the issue. Id.
' See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 881; Young, 240 F.3d at 369; Coady, 213 F.3d at
1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander, 72 F.3d at 938; Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1451.
' 43 F.3d 1451. Baylin involved a dispute between a partnership and the
State Roads Commission of the Maryland State Highway Administration, which
condemned certain road-side lands owned by the partnership. The partnership
disputed the State's valuation of its property and challenged it in court. The
partnership's attorney's fees were to be paid pursuant to a contingency fee agreement.
After winning the case, the partnership deducted the legal fees as a business expense
incurred in the collection of income. Id. at 1452-53.
" See id. at 1454.
62 Id.
Id.
See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454.
Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
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income doctrine to bar the exclusion of contingency fees from
gross income." Finding that the Wisconsin lien laws created no
proprietary interest in the plaintiffs claim,67 and thus
implicitly distinguishing the statutes from those at play in
Cotnam, s Judge Posner stated that the effect of excluding
attorney fees was the same as assigning the judgment income
to the law firm.6 9 He also noted that "had [the plaintiff] paid the
law firm on an hourly basis, the fee would have been an
expense. It would have been a deduction from, not a reduction
of, his gross income." 7' Finally, Posner dealt a "death-blow" to
the "exclusion" line of cases when he wrote that the Cotnam
rationale "badly flunks the test of neutral principles" and that
"it is often the case that to obtain income from an asset one
must hire a skilled agent and pay him up front; that expense is
a deductible expense, not an exclusion from income. 71
This circuit split regarding whether an attorney's
contingency fees should be included or excluded in the
calculation of the plaintiffs gross income is the source of
numerous problems. First, this conflict is horizontally
inequitable in that it is contrary to the principle that Federal
tax laws should be applied uniformly, independent of
geographic distinctions.72 Second, the majority view, which
requires inclusion, has the effect of imposing significant taxes
on successful plaintiffs.7 3 Finally, in the context of the CFCA,
which is largely enforced through qui tam litigation, this tax
penalty has the effect of stifling the anti-fraud purpose of the
CFCA.7 ' The following two sections explore more fully how this
trend towards inclusion in the circuits negatively impacts the
efficacy of the CFCA. 6
See id. at 884.
In fact, the court held that Wisconsin law prohibited an attorney from
obtaining an ownership interest in a client's claim. See id.
See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (stating that
Alabama attorney lien laws created a proprietary interest in the plaintiff's claim).
See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884.
70

Id. at 883.

71 See Memorandum, Tax Implications of FCA Damages Award or Settlement

(citing Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001)) (on file with author).
71 See Dilts v. United States, 845 F. Supp. 1505, 1510 (D. Wyo. 1994).
71 See analysis supra Part IIA-B.
7' See analysis infra Part IV.B.
7' This Note does not seek to resolve the inclusion/exclusion debate or
side's argument is more legally sound. Rather, it acknowledges the
which
analyze
apparent trend in the circuits to require inclusion of attorney's fees in the plaintiffs
gross income and discusses the negative impact of inclusion on the CFCA. The
proposed solution is limited to the issues which arise in the CFCA context, and does
not purport to address the larger inclusion/exclusion issue.
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THE CIL
FALSE CLAIMS ACT: PROSECUTING FRAUD ON
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT

To provide a context for considering how the inclusion of
attorney's fees in conjunction with the AMT operates to reduce
incentives for prospective relators to initiate qui tam actions,
subsection A describes the general purpose and relevant
provisions of the CFCA. Subsection B then addresses the risks
qui tam plaintiffs face in initiating a CFCA action.
A.

Overview of the Civil False ClaimsAct

In 1986 Congress amended the CFCA, and in doing so,
commenced the "bold experiment" of allowing private
participation in the decidedly governmental arena of law
enforcement.76 These amendments sought to strengthen the qui
tam provisions of the original statute by enhancing incentives
for private individuals to bring actions for fraud on behalf of
the federal government.7 7 In effect, the qui tam provisions
permit a private plaintiff, termed a "relator," to "step into the
Government's shoes" and file a civil action for violations of the
CFCA.7 While there is no limit on the subject matter of CFCA
cases, the most common scenarios involve government
contractor fraud, healthcare industry fraud, defense industry
fraud, and grant fraud."
Since the addition of the 1986 amendments, qui tam
suits have been an important enforcement mechanism of the
Kovacic, supra note 4, at 766.
Id. at 766 (citing William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as
Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1801-07
(1996) (discussing adoption of 1986 Civil False Claims Act Amendments)). The CFCA
was originally enacted in 1863 as a remedy to the pervasive contractor fraud that
occurred during the Civil War. In 1943, the statute was revised to narrow the relator's
ability to bring a suit and receive a monetary reward. The statute was so severely
constricted by the 1943 amendments that it became ineffective as a deterrent to
contractor fraud. It was not until the statute was again amended in 1986 that its
efficacy as a fraud prevention tool was revitalized. The 1986 amendments reduced the
burden of proof on relators, expanded the pool of those who could be qui tam relators,
and increased the financial incentives to bring a qui tam action. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMMITTEE,
Qui TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 1-12 (Howard W. Cox & Peter B.
Hutt II eds., 2d ed. 1999).
7
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW
PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMMITTEE, supra note 77, at 1.
7
ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 4 (2001).
Grant fraud is the misuse of government grant funds or procurement of funds via false
statements on the grant application. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF PUBLIC
CONTRACT LAW PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMMITTEE, supra note 77, at 1.
7'
77

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1

CFCA. s° With the addition of the enhanced qui tam provisions,
relators are now able to work in partnership with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to fight against fraudulent use of
public funds. Some of the largest qui tam recoveries include a
$375 million settlement paid by National Medical Care for
submitting false claims for laboratory testings' and a $1.4
billion settlement paid by Columbia HCA for Medicare fraud."
1. Liability Provisions of the Civil False Claims Act
The CFCA imposes civil liability on any person who
knowingly presents false claims for payment to the
Government; knowingly makes a false record or statement to
get a false or fraudulent claim paid by the Government;
conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false claim
paid; or knowingly makes a false record or statement to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government. The penalties for such
violations are court assessments of up to $11,000 per false
claim filed,' whether or not there are actual damages, plus
three times the amount of damages which the Government
sustains as a result of the fraudulent acts.8 '
2. Enforcement Provisions
The CFCA provides that either the Attorney General or
a "private person" can bring an action in the name of the
Government for a violation of the CFCA."6 Courts have broadly
construed the language of this statute to grant standing to a
wide variety of relators, including: individual citizens;
employees of institutions that receive government funds; and

o Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Department
Recovers Over $3 Billion in Whistleblowers False Claims Act Awards and Settlements
(Feb. 24, 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/February/079civ.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2004).
8I ld.

National Press Club, The Top 100 False Claims Act Settlements (Dec. 30,
2003), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/fraudrep.pdf (last visited
Aug. 20, 2004).
" See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
'4 64 Fed. Reg. 47,099 (Aug. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 71)
increased the statutory penalty from $10,000 to $11,000 for violations occurring after
September 29, 1999.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
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private companies," so long as the relator is the "original
source" of the information if the fraud has been publicly
disclosed.88 Thus, virtually any party privy to information
regarding violations of the CFCA can bring an action for
damages on behalf of the Government under the Act's qui tam
provisions.
3. Award to the Qui Tam Relator
The CFCA further provides that qui tam relators
receive a portion of the Government's award if the suit is
successful. If the DOJ proceeds with an action brought by a
person under a subsection of the CFCA, the relator is entitled
to receive at least fifteen percent but not more than twenty-five
percent of the proceeds of that action.89 If the DOJ does not
intervene, the relator's share increases to twenty-five to thirty
percent to compensate for the additional risk and effort of
prosecuting the action alone.9"
The CFCA identifies several factors that affect the
percentage of the Government's award apportioned the
relator.9 On the one hand, the percentage depends on the
extent to which the relator contributed to the prosecution of the
action. This includes timely reporting of the fraud, disclosure of
his participation in the fraud, and other relevant facts. If the
relator did not fully cooperate in discovery or at trial, the
Government can be expected to argue that the relator should
receive only a fifteen percent share of the judgment, the
CFCA's statutory minimum. On the other hand, if the relator
cooperated fully in the Government's investigation and
provided assistance during discovery by making full disclosure
87

See Kovacic, supra note 4, at 768.

u 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000). See also Raegan A. McClain, The
Government, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - Working Towards Remedying the
Problems with the Civil False Claims Act: Where Do We Go From Here?, 10 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 191, 201 (2001). "Original source" is defined by the CFCA as "an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing
an action under this section which is based on the information." 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
" 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000). In certain circumstances, where the court
finds that the relator plays only a minimal role in the CFCA suit, the statutory
percentage is reduced to no more than 10% of the Government's award. See id.
'0 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2000). See also JONATHAN A. WILLENS, NAT'L INST.
FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, COMMENTARY: 31 U.S. § 3730, at LEXIS, 31 US NITA 3730.
91 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
92 WILLENS, supra note 90.
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of evidence, the court is more likely to find the statutory
maximum of twenty-five percent appropriate.93
4. Attorney's Fees Provision
In addition to the relator's share of the Government's
recovery, the CFCA also includes a fee-shifting provision which
provides that qui tam relators are entitled to reasonable
expenses, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs, all of which
are to be awarded against the defendant.9 4 Attorney's fees
awarded under the CFCA's fee-shifting provision differ
markedly from the typical contingency fee arrangement. In the
typical contingency fee arrangement, a plaintiff enters into an
agreement with his attorneys whereby the attorneys receive a
certain or graduated percentage of the plaintiffs ultimate
recovery.95 However, this is not the case with CFCA awarded
attorney's fees. Under the CFCA, attorney's fees are to be
awarded in addition to a relator's statutory percentage.96
Furthermore, the attorney's fees that the court awards are
completely independent of the underlying fee arrangements
between a relator and his counsel.9 7 Thus, if a qui tam relator
were to enter into a forty percent contingency fee arrangement
with his attorneys and then was later awarded reasonable
attorney's fees by the court, the pre-existing contractual
arrangement between the relator and his counsel would not be
affected by the statutory award.98 Accordingly, the attorney
would receive his hourly rate as calculated by the court during
the attorney's fee hearing and, if provided for by the
contingency fee arrangement, the attorney would also receive
forty percent of the relator's statutory percentage pursuant to
the contingency fee arrangement.99

Id.

31 U.S.C. § 3730.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 344 (5th ed. 2000).

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992); Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1989).
See Blanchard,489 U.S. at 96.
The issue of whether the relator has to pay a percentage of her award
pursuant to the contingency fee agreement in addition to the court awarded fees is
determined solely by the terms of the contingency fee arrangement. However, it is
common practice for the contingency fee agreement to be paid regardless of whether
additional attorney's fees are awarded by the court.
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5. Purpose of the Qui Tam Provisions of the CFCA
Given the mechanics of the CFCA's qui tam provisions,
there are many objectives served by the 1986 enactment of
these private enforcement provisions. At the most general
level, the addition of enhanced qui tam provisions to the CFCA
in 1986 sought to remedy the perceived problem that the
Government fails to investigate and prosecute fraud as
vigorously as taxpayers would like. °° The qui tam provisions
invigorate the prosecution of CFCA violations in a number of
ways. First, the qui tam provisions, by allowing private
individuals to bring enforcement suits, reduce the costs
associated with oversight, investigation, and prosecution of
acts of fraud perpetrated against the Government.10 ' Private
individuals who are already situated within businesses that
contract with the Government can identify fraud at a lower cost
than public employees because they are already familiar with
the contractors' activities and can more readily assess relevant
information." 2
Second, because it is often difficult or impossible for the
Government to gain access to the information required to
identify acts of fraud, the qui tam provisions grant persons
with direct and immediate access to such information the
ability to enforce the CFCA in situations in which the
Government could not.' Simply put, the DOJ's investigative
tools are inadequate to gather the information required to
mount a successful CFCA prosecution!" This is because the
DOJ civil attorneys, who primarily rely on FBI reports and
information gathered by various Inspectors General, have no
authority to compel document production prior to filing a
suit.' Consequently, prior to the enactment of the qui tam
provisions, the DOJ allowed many potential violations to go
unprosecuted because of inadequate information.' 6 As the
Senate Report for the CFCA acknowledged, "[dletecting fraud
is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals
" William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices
in Government Contracting,29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1806 (1996).
101 See id. at 1825 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. H9382-03 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)).
...See id. at 1821-24.
10. See id. at 1822.
1o3 See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5271.
I!d.
10'Id.
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who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the
fraudulent activity.",1 7 For example, while the Government

would have to initiate a full investigation and audit to discover
any misdoings, a defense plant manager who was personally
instructed to inflate the number of employees and hours for the
books could easily identify the fraud."8
Third, allowing public enforcement of the CFCA
counteracts the institutional incentives that contracting
government agencies may have for not exposing and
prosecuting incidents of fraud.0 9 For example, a government
agency may be hesitant to expose a fraud that it is aware of for
fear that the resulting scandal would endanger future funding
of its programs."0 Moreover, government employees, under
pressure from Congressmen or other government officials,
might refrain from aggressively investigating certain contracts
to protect specific programs."' Consequently, a significant
number of frauds would presumably go unprosecuted were the
DOJ to rely solely on contracting agencies to disclose fraud."2
By empowering relators to sue on the Government's behalf, the
qui tam provisions increase the flow of information about fraud
to the DOJ, and reduce the possibility that reported frauds will
go unprosecuted because of pressure on government
employees."'
Thus, the qui tam provisions of the CFCA do not merely
add an additional, private vehicle for the prosecution of frauds
which violate the CFCA; in many cases, they supply the only
vehicle. In these instances, the qui tam mechanism constitutes
the final line of defense for the Government and for taxpayers.
Without these provisions, a multitude of frauds, the losses from
which would ultimately be borne by taxpayers, would continue
undeterred.

107
'o
'
11

Id. at 4.
See Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1822.
Id. at 1823.
See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX 327-47

(1986); MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS:
EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 20-21 (1989); Patrick J.
DeSouza, Note, Regulating Fraud in Military Procurement:A Legal Process Model, 95
YALE L.J. 390, 399 (1985).
.. Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1823.
112

Id.

11

Id. at 1823-24.
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Risks Facing Qui Tam Relators

The 1986 amendments to the CFCA greatly enhanced
the protections afforded to relators who brought qui tam
actions. Specifically, the CFCA protects the relator from
retaliation by his or her employer. 114 The statute explicitly
prohibits discharge, demotion, suspension, and harassment
resulting from the relator's role in a CFCA suit."5 If there is
any such discrimination, the statute entitles the relator "to all
relief necessary to make the employee whole." This relief
includes "reinstatement with the same seniority status such
employee would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times
the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of
the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees." 6
However, notwithstanding the CFCA's protection
provisions, qui tam relators still face substantial professional
risk by initiating a CFCA action." 7 As the United States
District Court for the Central District of California noted,
"[p]ublic disclosure of the filing of the complaint, in spite of the
rights provided by [the CFCAI, will often result in termination
of that relationship or in a compromised opportunity for future
Furthermore, the disclosure to the
advancement.""'
Government may result in the suspension of a governmental
procurement program, thus jeopardizing the relator's continued
employment and creating difficulty for the relator in finding
future employment in the same industry.1 9
In calculating the professional risks faced by relators,
factors such as their standing in an industry must be
considered. Given the complex nature of commercial
transactions, the fraudulent activity revealed by a relator is
likely to consist of highly technical violations. 2 ' Therefore, the
insiders who have access to this information necessarily occupy
senior positions in the corporate heirarchy and are deeply

"'
115
116

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
Id.
Id.

117 WEST, supra note 79, at 17.
" United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1084, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
119 Id.

" Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 62 (2002).
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ingrained in the corporate culture. 2 ' Because these relators
tend to be highly skilled and well-placed in their organization,
these insiders incur greater risks than do lower-level
employees whose skills and corporate position are more easily
replaced."'
Beyond the professional sphere, a qui tam relator also
faces considerable personal hardship in filing a suit.'23 A qui
tam relator website warns that "whistleblowing activity has
proven to be very hard on a whistleblower's personal life."'2 4
The website suggests that persons contemplating disclosing
fraud and initiating a CFCA action ask themselves, "Am I
mentally ready to have my fellow workers and perhaps my
friends turn against me because of my lawsuit?" and "Am I
ready for personal attacks against my character and to have
my past indiscretions made public?" 25 That a website intended
to be a relator resourse would pose such questions is a clear
indicator of the adversity that faces qui tam relators.
In the end, the statutory safeguards against harassment
and demotion put in place by the 1986 amendments to the
CFCA, although important, are not sufficient to compensate
relators for the residual risk they face. Only a generous share
of the Government's recovery will induce some relators to bring
a qui tam action.126 As discussed above, while the CFCA does
provide protection against outright dismissal and overt
harassment for bringing a qui tam suit, these anti-retaliation
provisions cannot quash the "institutional hostility" that the
filing of a qui tam suit is likely to provoke.2 7 A prospective
relator with a bright professional future must assume that
filing a qui tam suit will preclude future advancement within
the company, and perhaps, within the industry at large.'2 8
Consequently, a professionally well-placed relator will likely
initiate a qui tam suit only if the expected gains from the suit
are greater than the expected gains from his or her continued
career.291 With this in mind, the vital importance of the relator's
121

Id.

122

id.

1" See WEST, supra note 79, at 17.
12, How to Decide if Your Charges Can be Turned Into a Successful Qui Tam
Case, at http://www.quitam.com/wb2.html (last visited July 27, 2004).
125 Id.
121

See Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1819-20.

127

Id. at 1819.

128

id.

129 Id.
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statutory award becomes clear: without sufficient financial
incentive, the qui tam enforcement provisions of the CFCA can
not be effective. Were this not the case, the addition of the antiretaliation measures alone would have been sufficient to
encourage relators to bring suit, and presumably Congress
would not have increased the relator's award when it amended
the statute in 1986.
IV.

INCLUSION OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THE

QuI TAM CONTEXT

In light of the essential role that the qui tam provisions
play in the enforcement of the CFCA and the risks facing qui
tam relators, the amount of the relator's award is of critical
importance. Generally, under fee-shifting statutes such as the
provision included in the CFCA, any awarded attorney's fees
are paid directly to the plaintiff for subsequent payment to the
attorney.'3 ° This means that following a judgment in the
plaintiffs favor, the plaintiff can himself be awarded attorney's
fees, and then use those funds to pay his attorney pursuant to
their agreement.' Attorney's fees are separate and distinct
from the plaintiffs judgment and are only awarded if the
plaintiff makes a separate application for them.'32 This rule
flows from the Supreme Court holding that attorney's fees are
awarded to parties, not counsel, by virtue of the fact that
attorneys do not have standing to seek fees for themselves.'33
As fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions, such as the one
included in the CFCA, are paid to plaintiffs and not to
attorneys, in "inclusion" circuits these fees constitute taxable
income to such plaintiff.' While there is extremely limited case
law addressing the issue of taxation of statutory attorney's fees
3' See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 873-75 (9th Cir. 1999);
Turner v. Sec'y of Air Force, 944 F.2d 804, 808 (11th Cir. 1991); Richardson v. Penfold,
900 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1990).
131

See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 874-75.

132

Id. at 873-75.

See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1986). See also Willard v. City
of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 1986); Freeman v. B & B Assocs., 790 F.2d
145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In the context of civil rights suits, the Supreme Court has
stated, 'while it is undoubtedly true that Congress expected fee shifting to attract
competent counsel to represent citizens deprived of their civil rights, it neither
bestowed fee awards upon attorneys nor rendered them nonwaivable." Evans, 475 U.S.
at 731.
13 See United States ex rel. Doe v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d
421
(M.D. Pa. 1999); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
410,
(holding that attorney's fees constitute income to the plaintiff even though they were
paid by the court directly to the attorney).
'3
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in the context of CFCA qui tam actions, it appears that the rule
that attorneys do not have standing to seek fees for themselves
holds true in the qui tam context as well.
A.

The Relator'sAward: Calculatingthe Bottom Line

The economic realities that face a successful qui tam
plaintiff are best demonstrated by example. Suppose a CFCA
relator enters into a typical, forty percent contingency fee
arrangement with her attorneys. Suppose further that the
relator's claim results in a $20 million award for the
Government. Based on the level of the relator's cooperation and
evidence, the court awards her twenty percent of the judgment,
or $4 million.'36 Upon subsequent application of the relator, the
court awards the relator reasonable attorney's fees in the
amount of $4 million. 137 Thus, the defendant pays a total of $24
million that is divided as follows: $16 million for the United
States Government; $4 million for the relator; and $4 million
for the relator's attorneys. However, as it was the relator that
made the application for the attorney's fees, in an "inclusion"
circuit the relator would have to include the fees in her gross

1"

See Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 421. Despite the Ninth

Circuit's general rule that attorney's fees constitute income to the plaintiff and thus
must be included in the calculation of their gross income, they have nonetheless
allowed attorney's fees awarded in qui tam actions under the CFCA to be paid directly
to the relator's attorney. United States ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts &
Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d 574 (9th Cir. 1996). The court reasoned that if the fees were to be
paid to the plaintiff, it would be a "compensatory payment which really belongs to the
United States subject to allocation of a portion to the plaintiff." Id. at 578 (citing
United States ex rel. Gibeault v. Texas Instruments Corp., 25 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 1994)).
In other words, according to the Ninth Circuit, if the attorney's fees were awarded to
the plaintiff, they would have to be included in the government's total judgment, of
which the plaintiff only gets a portion. Consequently, as the relator is liable for 100% of
the legal fees under the statute, he would be damaged because most of the fees would
go to the government despite the relator's personal liability to his attorneys. See id.
No other "inclusion" circuit has yet to adopt this exception for CFCA
attorney's fees. In fact, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania has explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, holding that the
plain language of section 3730(d)(1) requires that the defendant pay attorney's fees to
the relator. PennsylvaniaBlue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 421. Further emphasizing its
point, the court stated, "[t]hat the court should concern itself with the final recipient of
the funds is not a matter addressed by the statute." Id.
13 This 20% share was used in this example because it is the median share
allowed by the CFCA. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000).
137 The commonly accepted
approach for calculating reasonable fees is the
"lodestar" approach. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986). The lodestar amount is calculated by multiplying the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Id.
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income. 138 Thus, assuming the relator had no additional income
for the year and no above the line deductions, the relator's
adjusted gross income in this example would be $8 million. As
the AMT would be triggered in this situation, and no
miscellaneous itemized deductions are permitted in calculating
AMTI, the relator's total tax liability in this example would be
$2,236,500139 more than fifty percent of her statutory share.
Thus, after paying her taxes, the relator would be left with only
$1,764,500,'14 approximately one fourth of her statutory share
or eight percent of the $20 million award. Further aggravating
the situation, the relator could then have to pay her attorney
forty percent of her statutory share pursuant to the
contingency fee agreement. 4 ' This leaves the relator with a
relatively miniscule $164,000.14' Had the attorney's fees been
excludable, the relator's tax liability would have been
$1,560,528.50,14 leaving the relator $2,439,471.50, thirty-eight
percent more than if the fees had been included." The relator's
attorneys will, of course, have to pay tax on all of the monies
they receive in fees as well.
B.

Reduced Incentives: The CFCA Relator's Significant Tax
Burden

While the enhancements made by the 1986 amendments
have been exceedingly successful in increasing the number of
qui tam recoveries, 5 the full potential of the 1986 amendments
"8

See Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 421; Baylin, 43 F.3d at

1454.

...The tentative minimum tax on $8,000,000 is calculated as follows: 26% of
$175,000 = $45,500. $45,500 + (28% of $7,825,000) = $2,236,500. See 26 U.S.C.A. §
55(b)(1)(A)(i) (2004).
140 $4,000,000 - $2,236,500 = $1,764,500.
"' The issue of whether the relator has to pay a percentage of her award
pursuant to the contingency fee agreement in addition to the court awarded fees is
determined solely by the terms of the contingency fee arrangement. However, it is
common practice for the contingency fee agreement to be paid regardless of whether
additional attorney's fees are awarded by the court.
142 40% of $4,000,000 = $1,600,000. $1,763,000-$1,600,000 = $163,000.
" The tax on $4,000,000 is calculated as follows: $75,528.50 + 39.6% of
adjusted gross income in excess of $250,000 (($4,000,000 - $250,000) x .396 =
$1,485,000 + $75,528.50 = $1,560,528.50). See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004).
" $2,439,471.50 - $1,763,000 = $676,471.50 / $1,763,000 = 38%.
"5 See Press Release, United States Dep't Justice, Justice Department
Recovers Over $1 Billion in Qui Tam Awards and Settlements (Oct. 18, 1995), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/October95/542.txt.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004);
Press Release, United States Dep't Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3
billion in Whistleblowers False Claims Act Awards and Settlements (Feb. 24, 2000), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/February/079civ.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
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is being stifled by the current state of the tax law concerning
attorney contingency fees. The inclusion of fees awarded under
fee-shifting statutes in a relator's gross income continues to
penalize relators for bringing a CFCA action. " " This is contrary
to Congress's intent in including a fee-shifting provision in the
CFCA and lessens the overall effectiveness of the qui tam
enforcement provisions."'
It must first be noted that fee-shifting statutes are a
departure from the long-standing American rule that each
party in a case is responsible for paying their own legal fees,
and are in no way the standard practice of the American
judicial system. "8 The Supreme Court has recognized that the
special purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to "enable private
parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries
resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific
federal laws." "9 In the context of qui tam suits, the fee-shifting
provisions of the CFCA were enacted specifically to facilitate
relator-initiated suits with a view towards the ultimate goal of
redressing injuries
sustained by the United States
Government."' Without the fee-shifting provisions, Congress
believed that this goal could not be met because private
individuals did not have the financial wherewithal to initiate
costly qui tam actions."'
However, because of the adverse tax consequences
presently facing qui tam relators in inclusion circuits, the
benefits of the fee-shifting provisions that were anticipated by
Congress have been greatly reduced. Indeed, as demonstrated
by the example in section IV.A, the relator in a CFCA action
could theoretically be made to pay tax on two hundred
percent152 or more of his statutorily prescribed share of the

.. See analysis infra Part IV.B.
147 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 29 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5294
(Unavailability of attorneys fees inhibits and precludes many private individuals, as
well as their attorneys, from bringing civil fraud suits.).
148 See Buckhannon Bd. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 598 (2001) (Under the 'American Rule,' parties are ordinarily required to bear
their own attorney's fees, and courts follow a general practice of not awarding fees to a
prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.).
149 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
546, 565 (1986).
"0 S.REP. No. 99-345, at 23-24.
"' Id. at 28.
15 In the example from Part IV.A, the relator was awarded $4 million as her
statutory share and $4 million in attorney's fees. As those fees are taxed to the relator,
she owes taxes on $8 million, or two-hundred percent of her statutory share.

2004]

A PARTNERSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT?

Government's award. 5 3 This dramatic tax imposed on CFCA

relators is the functional equivalent of the Internal Revenue
Service reducing the CFCA's statutory fifteen to twenty-five
percent share in circuits where attorney contingency fees must
be included in a relator's gross income. For example, the aftertax proceeds of a relator in an exclusion circuit who received a
$4 million, twenty percent share, is $1,764,500." If a relator
were to net the same amount in an inclusion circuit, it would
mean that he was only awarded a fourteen percent share of the
Government's total award, six percent less than the relator in
an exclusion circuit. 55 Of course, it is impossible for a court to
award a relator only fourteen percent, as the absolute
minimum
statutory share for a cooperative relator is fifteen
156
M

percent.

In the face of explicit statutory language stating that a
relator's fair share is based on the level of his participation in
the CFCA action,'5 1 the substantial tax incurred by relators in
inclusion circuits amounts to a reduction of financial incentives
that is contrary to Congress's stated intent. The language of
the CFCA is clear: the amount awarded to a qui tam relator is
to be based on "the extent to which the person substantially
contributed to the prosecution of the action.""18 Because relators

in inclusion circuits are taxed significantly more than relators
in exclusion circuits for bringing the same type of qui tam
actions, their compensation for performing the same duties is
reduced. 9 As this reduction is not based on the relator's
involvement in, or dedication to, the prosecution of the CFCA
violation, it is at odds with the language and purpose of the
CFCA.
Likewise, the fact that subsection (d)(3) of the CFCA
allows for a reduced relator's award only in limited
circumstances also supports the contention that Congress had
...See analysis supra Part N.A.
" See analysis supra Part W.A. Of course, the relator may also have to pay
out a portion of his or her recovery pursuant to the contingency fee agreement, further
reducing the net profit. Id.
155 14% of $20 million is $2,800,000. The tax on $2,800,000 is calculated as
follows: $75,528.50 + 39.6% of adjusted gross income in excess of $250,000 (($2,800,000
- $250,000) x .396 = $1,009,800 + $75,528.50 = $1,085,328.50). See 26 U.S.C.A. § 68
(2004). The net proceeds ($1,714,671.50) are calculated by subtracting the tax
($1,085,328.50) from the gross award ($2,800,000).
'" See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000).
117 See id.
158 Id. See also analysis supra Part III.A.3.
See analysis supra Part IV.A.
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a definite and purposeful scheme in mind for the compensation
of relators.6 0 The statute only allows for a reduction of
compensation "if the court finds that the action was brought by
a person who planned and initiated the violation of section
3729 upon which the action was brought." 6 '
Further, while the tax consequences discussed above
may seem sufficiently unfair to justify changing the inclusion
tax policy, the fact that attorney's fees in CFCA actions are
awarded via fee-shifting statute means that a relator could
suffer an even greater tax burden. As has happened in civil
rights cases, where attorney's fees are also awarded via feeshifting statute,'6 2 damages can be significantly lower than the
awarded attorney's fees.' 63 If the damages are dramatically
lower than the fees awarded, the taxes owed by the plaintiff on
the attorney's fees may in fact exceed the damages, leaving the
plaintiff in the red despite his victory in court." In effect, the
plaintiff "can be penalized financially for bringing a
meritorious case" under the statute. 6 ' For instance, if a civil
rights plaintiff was awarded $2,000,000 in damages and
$1,000,000 for attorney's fees, but the damages were later
reduced to $250,000 on appeal, the taxes due on the attorney's
fees alone would exceed the damages awarded by over
$26,000.1" The same risk exists in qui tam actions. Under the
CFCA, an attorney's legal fees could easily exceed the relator's
statutory share of the Government's award if an extended
litigation exposed only minimal fraud. In this situation, even
M
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See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (2000).

Id.
.62See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) (2000) (The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. ); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2000) (The court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs. ); Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (The court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee [ ]as part of the costs.); Americans With Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000) (The court or agency, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee.).
" See, e.g., Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764,
778-79 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (reducing plaintiffs $3 million award to $300,000, but leaving
the $949,761.26 awarded for fees and costs in Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. Of Cook
County, No. 98-c-1393, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16005 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2002)).
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See id.

See 147 CONG. REC. S5273 (daily ed. May 21, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Collins).
'. The tentative minimum tax on $1,000,000 is calculated as follows: 26% of
$175,000 = $45,500. $45,500 + (28% of $825,000) = $276,500. $276,500 - $250,000 =

$26,500. See 26 U.S.C.A § 55(b)(1)(A)(i) (2004).
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though the relator would receive only a minimal recovery, the
time expended by his attorneys would result in substantial fees
which would ultimately be taxed to him.
In sum, adequate compensation for relators is necessary
to induce them to initiate qui tam litigation because their net
benefit must outweigh the harms their professional lives will
sustain as a result of bringing the suit. Thus, if severe tax
burdens reduce the financial incentives to bring a qui tam
profit
presumably rational
action, potential relators,
maximizers,167 would forgo the risks of bringing a qui tam
action in favor of not disclosing the information and continuing
on their professional path. Hence, when tax burdens have the
effect of reducing the incentives prescribed by Congress to
encourage qui tam litigation, Congress's purpose of amending
the CFCA to include more potent qui tam provisions is
frustrated.
C.

A Partnershipwith the Government: Qui Tam Suits and
their Public Benefit

In addition to curbing the intended enforcement
potential of the CFCA, the severe taxes and the resulting
reduction in compensation to CFCA qui tam relators are even
more untenable in view of the fact that the qui tam relator is
performing a public good by initiating a qui tam action. The
amended CFCA was envisioned to facilitate a "public-private
partnership" that would battle against the "fraudulent use of
public funds."" The relator, suing for damages incurred by the
Government, would provide the evidence necessary to stop
fraud that was draining the national treasury at a rate of up to
$100 billion annually.'6 9 Thus, by initiating a qui tam suit, the
relator performs a service that benefits himself, in that the
relator receives a portion of the damages, but more
importantly, performs a service that also benefits the United
States Government and the public at large.
Every time a qui tam action is successful, stolen
taxpayer dollars are put back into the Government's coffers to
be used for legitimate purposes. As of 2003, approximately $12
167

The theory that individuals are rational profit maximizers supposes that

people exhibit a strong propensity to adjust their behavior in pursuit of benefits and to
avoid costs. For further discussion of this proposition, see Milton Friedman, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953).
" Press Release, supra note 80.
...See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3.
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billion dollars had been recovered through relator originated
CFCA actions.17 ° Without the efforts of qui tam relators, this
money would have been lost, and many programs which are
now funded by these recoveries would presumably have been
paid for with additional tax dollars. It seems then that qui tam
relators under the CFCA do what many politicians, DOJ
investigators, and government accountants cannot: they save
taxpayers money.171
However, while $12 billion is a sizeable savings for
taxpayers, the Government will ultimately derive the most
financial benefit from the prophylactic effects of CFCA
judgments. Prior to the enactment of the qui tam provisions of
the CFCA, procurement fraud was so prevalent because of the
lack of deterrence mechanisms in place.' First, it was unlikely
that acts of fraud would be detected, and second, if a fraud was
uncovered, chances of a successful prosecution were slim.'73 In
short, the pre-qui tam CFCA did not pose a sufficient threat to
deter fraud. According to the Senate, prior to the amendment of
the CFCA, the sad truth was that crime against the
Government often did pay. 174
Much has changed since the enactment of the qui tam
provisions of the CFCA. The relator-initiated qui tam suit now
provides a potentially powerful mechanism to deter fraud
against the Government.'75 For every CFCA judgment that was
a part of the $12 billion in total recoveries, untold numbers of
other government contractors became aware of the substantial
judgments and were put on notice that frauds were now more
likely to be prosecuted. For example, if one hospital receives a
$50 million judgment against it for submitting inflated claims
to the Government, numerous other hospitals that previously
engaged in similar activity will be disinclined to continue that
practice. Thus, qui tam recoveries are actually exponentially
more valuable to the Government and to taxpayers than they
may appear at face value. Consequently, by initiating a CFCA
action, the qui tam relator is not simply suing to recover
monies lost to a specific fraud, but is performing the even more
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The 100 Top False ClaimsAct Settlements, supra note 82, at 4.

'7'
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See Press Release, supra note 80.
See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3.

See id.
See id.
17' Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1800.
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valuable service of deterring countless other acts of fraud that
the Government could not otherwise prevent.
V.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The negative consequences of including CFCA
attorney's fees in the relator's gross income must be remedied
in order to give effect to congressional intent and encourage
universal application of the CFCA. This section will explore
possible solutions to this dilemma and will conclude by arguing
that the most appropriate solution is for Congress to amend the
Code's treatment of attorney's fees in the qui tam context.
A.

JudicialSolution: Leave it to the Courts

In 2004, after years of avoiding the issue, " 6 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in two cases to resolve the longstanding circuit split regarding the inclusion/exclusion
dispute.177 However, the trend in circuit courts to require
inclusion of attorney's contingency fees 78' does not bode well for
a Supreme Court verdict in favor of exclusion, especially since
the inclusion courts have used the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence to justify their position. 9 Thus, even though the
Court will resolve the circuit split so as to alleviate the
problems stemming from the uneven enforcement of the
CFCA,' 0 it appears likely that this resolution will come at the
expense of the CFCA's full anti-fraud potential.'
"' E.g., Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001).
117 See Comm'r v. Banks, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 2384 (Mar. 29, 2004); Comm'r
v.
Banaitis, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 2385 (Mar. 29, 2004).
178 The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits have held that
attorney contingent fees constitute gross income to the plaintiff. See Raymond v.
United States, 355 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.
2001); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Coady, 213 F.3d at 1187; Baylin
v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
' See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884; Young, 240 F.3d at 376; Coady, 213 F.3d at
1191; Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454.
o An additional problem posed by the circuit split regarding the inclusion of
attorney contingency fees is that the incentive to initiate CFCA qui tam actions varied
between circuits. Because of this disparity, the CFCA may not be uniformly enforced
throughout the country.
181 See discussion of impact of inclusion on enforcement of the CFCA supra
Part IV.B.
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However, even if the Court does decide the split in favor
of the inclusion circuits, the troubles that face CFCA relators
could still be remedied by the courts without legislative
intervention. For example, the Ninth Circuit, recognizing the
uniqueness of the CFCA qui tam situation, has held that CFCA
attorney's fees are to be paid directly to the attorney. 81 2 By this

approach, courts could acknowledge that attorney's fees in the
CFCA context are inherently different than contingency fees in
non-quasi-governmental actions, and thereby eliminate the
negative tax consequences imposed on relators by the AMT.
In United States ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck
Parts & Equipment, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
carved out an exception to the general rule and held that
attorney's fees should be paid directly to attorneys who
represent relators in CFCA suits."3 The court reasoned that the
attorney's fees awarded under the statute could not be awarded
to the relator because they would be the equivalent of a
"compensatory payment which really belongs to the United
States."" Further, because these compensatory fees would
have to be paid to the Government, they could only be
distributed to the plaintiff as part of his statutory percentage."
In other words, according to the Ninth Circuit, this distribution
scheme would result in the plaintiff only getting a fifteen to
twenty-five percent portion of the awarded attorney's fees.
Since the relator is liable for one hundred percent of the legal
fees under the statute, he would be damaged because most of
the fees would go to the Government
despite the relator's
81 6
personal liability to his attorneys.

Despite the seemingly advantageous result, it is highly
problematic to rely on the courts to craft a solution. First and
foremost, because the Virani exception has not been recognized
by the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that the circuits would
reach a consensus regarding an exception for qui tam relators.
This would inevitably lead to uneven application of such an
exception and ultimately would only add confusion to the
112

United States ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., 89

F.3d 574, 575 (9th Cir. 1996). The precise tax consequences of this decision have not
yet been determined by the courts, because the taxation of attorney's fees in the CFCA
context has not been challenged in the Ninth Circuit since this decision.
"' See id. at 579.
184 Id.
at 578 (citing United States ex rel. Gibeault v. Texas Instruments
Corp., 25 F.3d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1994)).
185Id.
18 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000).
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existing morass. In fact, there are already conflicting opinions
as to whether the CFCA requires fees to be paid directly to
attorneys." 7 In United States ex rel. Doe v. PennsylvaniaBlue
Shield, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania flatly rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Virani, holding that the plain language of section 3730(d)(1)
relator.8 8
requires that the defendant pay attorney's fees to the
While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed
the issue of whether CFCA attorney's fees must be paid
directly to attorneys, the Pennsylvania Blue Shield court's
decision makes clear that the Ninth Circuit's approach is not
universally accepted. 9
B.

Legislative Action

Rather than leaving it to the courts to stitch together a
patchwork solution, the Legislature must act to rectify the
inequities facing qui tam relators. One possible remedy
available to Congress is amending the Code to provide for the
total exclusion of all contingent and statutory attorney's fees
from the plaintiffs gross income. In addition to resolving the
tax problems faced by CFCA relators, this solution is
advantageous because the broad nature of this amendment
ensures horizontal equity among all classes of plaintiffs. 9 ° This
type of broad legislation, because of its application to all
similarly situated taxpayers, would also foster predictability
and consistency of judgments.
Another possible legislative remedy is amending the
Code to allow for complete above the line deductions of all
attorney contingency fees. This solution has the same
functional result as amending the Code to exclude contingency
fees: it resolves the circuit split, eliminates the adverse tax
consequences of bringing a CFCA suit, and results in
horizontal equity among all plaintiffs.' 9' Moreover, support for
such an amendment to the Code has already been expressed by
various groups. The New York Bar Association's tax section has
187

See United States ex rel. Doe v. Pa. Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421

(M.D. Pa. 1999).
' Id. Further emphasizing that it was not the business of the court to decide
this issue, the court stated, "[t]hat the court should concern itself with the final
recipient of the funds is not a matter addressed by the statute." Id.
- See id.
'90 JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (4th ed. 1983).
191 See id. at 626.
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argued that the "[f]ailure to allow deduction of [contingency
fees] undermines the tax policy goal of accurately measuring
taxpayers' real net incomes and taxing them at the appropriate
statutory rate."9 2
The major shortcoming of across-the-board exclusion/
deduction legislation is that it would result in a reduction in
tax revenue. Since Congress amended the Code in 1996 to
require that punitive damages and damages received on
account of non-physical injuries be included in gross income,'
the Government has received substantial tax revenue from
these cases.'
Given that the exclusion of all attorney
contingency fees accruing in cases with punitive and nonphysical injury damages would result in the removal of a
substantial amount of tax-generating income from the purview
of the 1996 amendments, the complete exclusion of attorney
contingency fees would substantially impair the revenue
generating ability of the 1996 amendments to the Code.
Congressional budget rules, known as "pay as you go" rules, or
PAYGO, make the revenue impact of the legislation a
paramount concern, as lost revenue that results from
legislation must be counter-balanced with legislation that
makes up for the loss through tax increases or spending cuts.9
Thus, Congress could probably not fix this problem by means of
such sweeping legislation without cutting programs or reaching
deeply into the pockets of other classes of taxpayers.
Because of the severe revenue consequences of
amending the tax code to entirely exclude attorney contingency
fees from a plaintiffs gross income or allowing full above the
line deduction of fees, a more tailored amendment, focusing
solely on attorney's fees in the CFCA context, might garner
more congressional support. Legislation which is pointed solely
at attorney's fees accrued during CFCA actions will permit
Congress to remedy the tax burden suffered by relators while
minimizing lost revenue.
"' Robert H. Scarborough, 2001 TNT 36-18 NYSBA Tax Section Analyzes
Civil Damages Legislation, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 22, 2001, at 31.
'"
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2000).
'94 Marcia Coyle, U.S. Tax on Damages Under Fire: Bill to Repeal '96 Levy
Has Backing of Both Business, Plaintiff Bar, 21 NAT. L. J. 50, Aug. 9, 1999, at Al
(stating that the estimated revenue resulting from the amendment through the year
2000 was $230 million).
" See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV 863, 866 (2002). In fact, the 1996 amendments
were implemented because Congress needed to make up revenue lost in giving tax
breaks to small businesses. Coyle, supra note 194 at All.
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In 2003, a bill sponsored by Senator Susan M. Collins
was introduced which was directed at remedying a similar tax
196
situation that occurs in the context of civil rights litigation.
The Civil Rights Tax Relief Act (CRTRA)'9 7 proposed to amend
the Code to exclude damages awarded in certain discrimination
suits from the plaintiffs gross income.'9 8 Naturally, as a result
of this exclusion, attorney contingency fees paid from the
award would also be excluded.'99
While this Note does not go so far as to suggest that the
portion of the Government's judgment in a qui tam suit allotted
to the relator should be excluded from his gross income,
amending the Code to provide that a CFCA plaintiff can
exclude or deduct his attorney's fees from his gross income is
perhaps the best solution to this problem. Amending the Code,
unlike a judge-found exception, would result in uniform
application of federal tax law to all qui tam relators regardless
of what circuit their action was litigated in. This certainty is
clearly an advantage over judicial resolution, as potential
relators in all circuits will be apprised of the tax consequences
of their bringing a CFCA suit up-front without having to
negotiate the murky waters of conflicting case law.
Moreover, because amending the Code will effectuate
the uniform application of tax law to all CFCA relators, it
would remove the possibility that relators in inclusion circuits,
wary of the tax penalty associated with bringing a qui tam
action, would be less inclined to initiate a CFCA suit. In effect,
such an amendment to the tax code would result in relators
from all circuits receiving equal statutory incentives to initiate
qui tam actions, as Congress had originally intended. °° Thus,
not only would federal tax law be uniformly applied, but also
the provisions of the CFCA would be uniformly enforced.
Of course, amending the Code in this tailored fashion is
also superior to a judge-found exception because its
" See Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, S. 557, 108th Cong. (2004), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108-cong bills&docid=f~s557
is.txt.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
197

id.

198Id. at § 2.
19 See 149 CONG. REC. S3316 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Collins). While the language of the CRTRA does not explicitly exclude attorney's fees
from a plaintiffs gross income, it does provide for the exclusion of plaintiffs damages
from gross income, which ultimately has the effect of excluding contingent attorney's
fees because they would be paid from the excluded damages. See id.
See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5266-67.
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implementation does not require an intrepid relator in an
inclusion circuit to bear the risk of added attorney's fees
resulting from the appeal from the tax court. It seems quite
possible to this author that if implementation of an exception
doctrine were left to the circuit courts, in many inclusion
jurisdictions the courts would not even have the opportunity to
create such a doctrine because relators, faced with the well
established inclusion precedent, would acquiesce rather than
challenge their tax situation and risk additional attorney's fees.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In amending the CFCA to provide enhanced incentives
for relators to bring qui tam actions, Congress sought to
eliminate acts of fraud perpetrated against the United States
Government. However, in certain circuits, the means employed
by Congress to attain this important objective are being
inhibited by an application of tax law which penalizes qui tam
relators for bringing these socially important suits. Moreover,
as only some of the federal circuits have required plaintiffs to
pay these extra taxes, the circuit split has resulted in some
jurisdictions having a less effective statutory tool for fighting
fraudulent acts, a result which is not only contrary to
Congressional intent, but also to the notion that federal law
should be consistently and neutrally applied.
Thus, to effectuate the strong public-private partnership
Congress envisioned in passing the amendments to the CFCA
and to provide uniformly vigorous enforcement of the Act
throughout the country, the split regarding the tax treatment
of attorney's contingency fees, at least in the CFCA qui tam
context, must be resolved in favor of eliminating the doubletaxation of attorney's fees. The solution proposed by this Note,
a focused amendment to the Code which provides for the
exclusion or above the line deduction of attorney contingency
fees from the calculation of the plaintiffs gross income solely in
the CFCA qui tam context, would remedy the problems caused
by the current inclusion/exclusion circuit split while curtailing
tax revenue lost by the amendment.

VII.

ADDENDUM

On the eve of publication of this Note, President George
W. Bush signed a bill into law that provides the tailored tax
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relief to relators that this Note has argued is appropriate.2 ' The
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) 2 includes a
modified version of the CRTRA that will eliminate the severe
tax consequences that face both civil rights plaintiffs and qui
tam relators. 3 Unlike the CRTRA's remedy, the relief provided
by the AJCA does not result from the exclusion of attorney's
fees from gross income. Rather, the AJCA has remedied the
problem by allowing attorney's fees and costs to be deducted in
their entirety from a plaintiffs/relator's gross income.
Specifically, section 703 of the AJCA, titled Civil Rights Tax
Relief, amends section 62(a) of the Code to allow for above the
line deduction of "attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on
behalf of, the taxpayer in connection with any action involving
a claim of a violation of [the CFCAI ."..
This means that
attorney's fees accrued in connection with a CFCA suit are now
entirely deductible from a relator's gross income,"5 and because
the legal expenses are no longer classified as miscellaneous
itemized deductions, their deduction is not barred by the
AMT." In effect, relator attorney's fees that are paid in
connection with claims settled after the effective date of the
AJCA 7 will be used to offset the income a relator receives from
the qui tam award. By way of example, if a relator in a
successful qui tam suit is awarded a statutory share of $2
million, attorney's fees of $1 million, and a contingency fee of
$500,000,"' the relator will have $3 million in gross income,
but, because of the amendment, the full $1.5 million in
attorney's fees will be deductible. Thus, the relator's taxable
income is only $1.5 million, not $3 million, as would have been
the case prior to the enactment of the AJCA.
Interestingly, an examination of the Congressional
Record reveals that the Senators, and even the members of the
conference committee, hoped and believed that the AJCA would
apply not only to future CFCA settlements, but also to
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American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004).
Id.

" Id. at. § 703.
Id.
205 See 26 U.S.C. § 62(a) (2000).
206 See 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A) (2000).
207 The effective date of the AJCA is October 23,
2004. See H.R. 4520 at § 703.
208 This $500,000 would be paid to the attorney from the $2 million award to
204

the relator.
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settlements reached prior to the enactment of the AJCA.'
Senator Grassley, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Finance and supporter of section 703 stated: "[I]t is my strong
belief that the courts and the IRS should apply the guidelines
of Section 703 not only after the date of enactment but also to
settlements put in place prior to that time.""' Unfortunately,
because the plain language of the AJCA states that it only
applies to attorney's fees paid in connection with CFCA suits
that were settled after October 23, 2004,1 many relators who
already settled their claims this year will presumably have to
fight to keep their CFCA awards in court. 1 ' Moreover, it is
unclear whether the legislative history of the AJCA will sway
the courts deciding the tax treatment of attorney's fees in
previously settled CFCA suits to allow for the deduction of fees
in light of the AJCA's apparently contrary language. Thus, the
question remains whether pre-enactment relators will benefit
from the AJCA as the Senators had hoped.

Edward T. Ackerman'

See CONG. REC. S11036 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Baucus).
Id. (statement of Sen. Grassley).
Id.
212 There have been numerous large qui tam settlements
reached in 2004 that
are beyond the purview of the AJCA, such as the $430 million Parke-Davis settlement
and the $27 million Warrick Pharmaceuticals settlement. See BNA PLUS Health Care
Fraud Settlements, at http://www.bna.com/bnaplus/docs/docfraud.htm (last visited
Oct. 26, 2004).
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